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There is a long-lasting quest of demarcating a minimally representational behavior.
Based on neurophysiologically-informed behavioral studies, we argue in detail that
one of the simplest cases of organismic behavior based on low-resolution spatial
vision–the visually-guided obstacle avoidance in the cubozoan medusa Tripedalia
cystophora–implies already a minimal form of representation. We further argue that
the characteristics and properties of this form of constancy-employing structural
representation distinguish it substantially from putative representational states
associated with mere sensory indicators, and we reply to some possible objections
from the liberal representationalists camp by defending and qualitatively demarcating
the minimal nature of our case. Finally, we briefly discuss the implications of our thesis
within a naturalistic framework.
Keywords: content, cubozoa, minimal representation, neurodynamic structure, perception, vision, constancy
mechanism, structural similarity
INTRODUCTION
Although any representationalist would agree that beliefs, desires and intentions held by humans
(or even all primates) are paradigmatic cases of representations, there is a strong debate regarding
how far down the line of organismic behavior one is justified to apply the concept of representation.
Liberal representationalists (Millikan, 1984, 2004; Price, 2001; Stegmann, 2009; Artiga, 2016, 2021;
Ganson, 2020) suggest, more or less, any sensory state that plays the role of a causal intermediary
between a stimulus and a behavior should be considered a representation. Such states–usually
labeled as mere indicators/detectors–need not be decoupled from their specific stimulus conditions,
and the related behaviors can even be highly inflexible1. Nevertheless, such states are considered by
liberal representationalists to contribute to the explanation of the behavior they trigger in virtue of
their putative representational properties2.
1Characteristic minimal such cases are any kind of taxis, such as chemotaxis, phototaxis, and magnetotaxis, etc., even in
unicellular organisms, as well as in plants and earthworms.
2However, not all liberal representationalists adhere to such a deflationary account. Dretske (1986, 1988), for instance,
distinguishes between recruitments done in biological organisms via natural selection and others done via some kind of
learning. In these latter categories, behavior can be altered based on the manipulation of the information carried by the
conditioned stimulus. In such cases, the organism’s behavior depends on the information carried by the related sensory
state, hence, the state is more than a causal mediator in the relation between the organism and the environment; for Dretske,
it carries information in a way that it should be considered a representation.
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The non-liberal representationalists (Sterelny, 1995; Ramsey,
2007; Burge, 2010; Rescorla, 2013; Schulte, 2015, 2019;
Gładziejewski and Miłkowski, 2017; Shea, 2018) argue that
there should be a limit to the range at which the concept of
representation could be extended down the line of behavior.
They suggest the scope question for the representation should be
settled on the basis of whether the representational description
of a state has an explanatory value that cannot be attained
by a non-representational description of that very state (see
Schulte, 2019 for a relevant discussion). Since liberal theories of
representation ascribe representational status and properties in
states that cannot play a crucial role in explaining a behavior,
these theories end up lowering too much the “lower border
of representation” (Burge, 2010, p. 549), and they thus face
the “breadth-of-application problem” (Burge, 2010, p. 304).
Burge’s main argument is that liberal accounts cannot distinguish
between sensory registrations and genuine representational
descriptions that are associated with a distinctively psychological
type of explanation.
Our aim in this paper is to search for the minimal form in
which a living being is capable of representing things, properties
or states of the environment. According to Burge’s account,
perceptions arise as “the most primitive kind of (non-deflated)
representation” (2010, p. 316), and such representations are to be
distinguished from deflated ones on the basis that they possess
contents with associated accuracy conditions. Burge (2010)
has strongly and influentially argued that what distinguishes
genuine representations from mere sensations, and hence,
genuine perception from mere sensitivity, is the employment of
constancy mechanisms. However, there are objections. Liberal
representationalists (Ganson, 2020) argue that there is no need
for the decoupleability introduced by a constancy mechanism
for a state to be representational. And some non-liberal
representationalists (Gładziejewski and Miłkowski, 2017; Shea,
2018) suggest exploitable structural correspondence is enough
for a state to be decoupled from the related sensory stimuli
without (even implicitly) considering the necessity for constancy
mechanisms in the employment of such correspondence.
In this paper, we aim to contribute to all these controversial
questions by complementing Burge in demarcating the minimal
case of perceptual representation. We will do so by analyzing
(1) what is the minimal form of visual perception, (2) why this
perception implies a minimal form of representation, and (3)
what is the determinate content of this representation. For the
purposes of this paper, we will focus on the visually guided
obstacle avoidance in Tripedalia cystophora (TC), a small jellyfish
belonging to class cubozoa (phylum Cnidaria). We have selected
this case for the following two reasons: (i) there is extensive
scientific literature on the eyes and vision of this animal, which
has been the object of many neurophysiologically-informed
behavioral studies (see Bielecki and Garm, 2018 for a review);
and (ii) its visual system is considered a minimal but full-
fledged form of true vision (perhaps one of the simplest cases of
low-resolution spatial vision in nature), a radically new sensory
capacity compared to the other classes of Cnidaria.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section “The Earliest
Case of True Vision: The Low-Resolution Spatial Vision of
the Cubozoan Medusae” we briefly present the optical and
visual characteristics of the low-resolution spatial vision of the
box jellyfish TC. In Section “Obstacle Avoidance in the Box
Jellyfish Tripedalia cystophora”, we describe the neuroethology
of obstacle avoidance in TC as explored in related empirical
studies. In Section “Obstacle Avoidance is Mediated by Structural
Representations”, we argue in detail that this case is based
on structural representations and is therefore a minimal form
of content-based visual perception. In Section “How Minimal
are the Perceptual Representations of TC? Replies to Some
Possible Objections From Liberal Representationalism” we reply
to some possible objections to our thesis from the liberal
representationalists camp, aiming mainly to defend and to
qualitatively demarcate the minimal nature of our case, while
we also briefly discuss the implications of this work within a
naturalistic framework. We conclude by summarizing our thesis.
THE EARLIEST CASE OF TRUE VISION:
THE LOW-RESOLUTION SPATIAL VISION
OF THE CUBOZOAN MEDUSAE
There is a consensus in nowadays science regarding the fact
that true vision begins with the formation of a composite set of
points in a continuous bi-dimensional part of the eye at which
light rays coming from a distal object meet after refraction or
reflection, forming an optical image. For a set of light inputs
from the surrounding environment forming an optical image at
any operational time, the eye detects spatial differences (spatial
information) in the form of light levels in the environment
and, along with certain neural mechanisms, processes them,
discerning lines, shapes and similar features within the field
of vision. Thus, the visual system identifies and categorizes
environmental features and assesses distances, movements and
shapes from among them, which in turn enables body movements
to be guided in relation to distal objects. In this sense, vision is an
integration process of light-based sensory information ending in
the formation of a new domain of sensory primitives (i.e., visual
percepts) that operate as new irreducible causal factors in the
brain, thus enabling new increasingly complex behaviors (Palmer,
1999).
One of the earliest cases of true vision in nature is the low-
resolution spatial vision of the cubozoan medusae (see Nilsson
et al., 2005; Nilsson, 2009). Cubozoan medusae (also known
as box jellyfish) have the most diverse behavioral repertoire of
all cnidarians and several of them are light-guided (Garm and
Ekström, 2010). Cubozoa are among those jellyfish that respond
fastest to changing light levels and object movement through
active swimming at rates of up to 2 m per second, combined
with rapid turns of up to 180◦. And although they possess both
mechanoreceptors and chemoreceptors, it is their eyes that enable
them to engage in swimming behaviors.
Cubozoa have a squarish (four sides, forming a box) bell that
has four complex neural structures called rhopalia located near
the edge of each side. Rhopalia harbor the sensorial organs of
cubozoa. Whereas other medusae have simple ocelli, cubozoa
are unique in the possession of true eyes, which are set in
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rhopalia. But rhopalia are also the main neural structures of the
jellyfish’s nervous system (NS) since they control the swimming
muscle contractions.
Each rhopalium contains six eyes, two of which are lens eyes
(one located at the lower part and the other located at the upper
part of the rhopalium), and the other four are simple pit- and slit-
like lensless eyespots3. All lens eyes have the major components of
a typical camera-type eye, structurally resembling the vertebrate
eye (Nilsson et al., 2005, see also Sections “Obstacle Avoidance in
T. cystophora Involves a Primitive Constancy Mechanism” and
“The Characteristics and Properties of the Neurophysiological
Process of Obstacle Avoidance”)4. The focal length is greater
than the distance between the retina and the center of the lens,
meaning that light rays are not in focus on the retina, but
rather, light from each point in the environment spreads over
a large part of the retina thus causing blurred optical images5
(Nilsson et al., 2005).
Next, we focus in the most interesting form of visually-guided
behavior in cubozoa by briefly describing the neuroethology
of obstacle avoidance–driven by the lower lens eyes–in the
box jellyfish T. cystophora (TC), as explored in related
empirical studies.
OBSTACLE AVOIDANCE IN THE BOX
JELLYFISH T. CYSTOPHORA
Tripedalia cystophoras are small cubozoa that live in mangrove
swamps, where they swim among the prop roots of Rhizophora
mangle trees passively preying on phototactic copepods which
gather in high densities in the light shafts between the roots
(Buskey, 2003). The fragility of their one-cell-thick epidermis
makes them quite vulnerable in their habitat which is replete with
mostly vertical, rough, sharp, or stingy obstacles, some of which
are even bacterially contagious for their surfaces. Nevertheless,
using its lower lens eyes, TC is able to detect and safely navigate
around these obstacles with apparent ease, neither touching nor
colliding with them (Garm et al., 2007a).
3These eyes are adapted to different elements of the visual environment
and perform different visual tasks (Land and Nilsson, 2006). Because of the
configuration and the orientation of the rhopalium, only the lower lens eyes are
involved in obstacle avoidance (Garm et al., 2007a). Due to its position, the upper
lens eye is used for long-distance navigation rather than obstacle avoidance (Garm
et al., 2011). The function of the eyespots is very little understood, but it seems that
they are not involved in the sensorial information relevant to obstacle avoidance
(Garm and Bielecki, 2008).
4There is a cornea (a covering layer of transparent cells), a crystalline lens with
a refractive index gradient, a layer of dark pigment covering the outside of the
retina and forming an iris around the lens, and a retina filled with microvilli that
protrude from the outer ciliary segments of its photoreceptor cells (for details see
Nilsson et al., 2005; Land and Nilsson, 2012, pp. 76–77).
5See Figure 4.4c in Land and Nilsson (2012) for a computer modeling of the
blurred portrait of one of the authors as it would be constructed by the lower lens
eye of the box jellyfish Tripedalia cystophora. According to Seymour and O’Hara
(2020), the under focused vision of T. cystophora is not an intrinsic limitation of
cubozoan vision, but a relationship between visual acuity and feeding ecology. For
example, the cubozoan Chironex fleckeri has a more acute vision because it feeds
on fast agile prey fish (whose locating requires sharp image focus), which is not the
case of T. cystophora that feeds on dense copepod swarms and therefore does not
need to visualize fine details while hunting (see also footnote 12).
As any other jellyfish, TC swims thanks to periodic bell
contractions which propels it forward. Depending on the patterns
of visual stimulation in each one of the rhopalia, discrete motor
signals are produced and transmitted to the ring nerve and
then through the velarium (a thin muscular sheet) to the bell,
constricting it in different directions during swim contractions.
When an obstacle appears in front of the animal, its swim pulse
rate increases, bell contraction in the direction of the obstacle is
delayed, and the opening of the velarium is pocketed out toward
a rhopalium in the direction of the obstacle. The result is that the
animal turns and swims away from the obstacle with an accuracy
of at least 45◦ in its turning direction (Garm et al., 2007a; Petie
et al., 2011, 2013; Garm et al., 2013).
As mentioned in Section “The Earliest Case of True Vision:
The Low-Resolution Spatial Vision of the Cubozoan Medusae”,
the main task in obstacle avoidance corresponds to the four
lower lens eyes, which are continuously active as they scan their
distinct visual fields6. To analyze this visual process, we will divide
the related operations carried out through the animal’s central
NS7 in three stages. The biggest part of the visual processing
happens in the rhopalial NS (see Bielecki et al., 2013 for details).
Specifically, in every interaction, the lower lens eye in each
rhopalium will process the flow of light inputs and construct an
integrated signal in its retina (stage 1). Then, in each rhopalium,
the already processed signal from the lower lens eye will be
forwarded to the pacemakers8 of the rhopalium, where it will
be further processed and combined (with other signals coming
from the other visual inputs) into one rhopalial output (stage
2). Then, the output signal from each rhopalium will be further
combined–through the ring nerve that is responsible for inter-
rhopalial communication–with the output signals from the other
rhopalia, so as to ensure an altogether efficient response (stage 3)9.
This will eventually generate the contraction of the bell-shaped
body in a discrete (one-to-one) manner that allows the animal to
swim (Garm and Bielecki, 2008).
Now, although there are three stages of visual processing, not
all these stages and, most importantly, not all related components
involved are practically relevant to our discussion about obstacle
avoidance. Let us briefly explain why. Starting by the latest stage
(3), the fact that rhopalial pacemaker signals trigger a one-to-
one swim contraction implies that multiple inputs (i.e., signals
from the pacemakers of more than one rhopalium) wouldn’t be
effectively functional. The most plausible hypothesis supported
by experimental data is that whichever rhopalium is modulated
by a visual input at any given time becomes the driving rhopalium
6In obstacle avoidance–as in all types of TC’s visual interaction with the
environment–all other (upper) lens eyes as well as the eyespots are also
simultaneously and continuously active receiving light rays from their own visual
fields and sending signals.
7The central NS of TC comprises the photoreceptors of the retina, the four
rhopalial nervous systems, and the ring nerve (Garm et al., 2006).
8A pacemaker is a set of subsystems of neurons that produce the discrete motor
signals that are sent to the muscles and control the animal’s movement via bell
contractions. Cubozoan pacemakers are located close to the insertion of the
rhopalial stalk (Garm et al., 2006).
9Each rhopalial NS is directly connected to the ring nerve through a bidirectional
epidermal stalk nerve through which each rhopalium is also attached to the bell of
the animal (Garm et al., 2007b).
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that hyperpolarizes the other rhopalia (via the ring nerve), thus
resetting the activity of all pacemakers in the other rhopalia. They
do so by not only inhibiting them, but also by decreasing them
to below baseline, thereby increasing the time required until they
can fire again (Stöckl et al., 2011). Thus, the animal’s behavior
is practically regulated at each instance of obstacle avoidance by
the dominant rhopalium–i.e., the rhopalium whose lower lens eye
interacts with an obstacle.
Considering thus only the dominant rhopalium, we pass to
stage 2, whose processing happens at the pacemaker. Again,
as mentioned, the most likely scenario is that each eye of
the rhopalium connects through interneurons to each own
pacemaker subsystem, and then the various subsystems are
integrated to produce the complex pacemaker signal (Bielecki
et al., 2013). However, even if we consider that each light
sensory organ produces its own different signal–therefore, some
form of necessary integration appears to be taking place within
the pacemaker–various experiments have demonstrated that
any form of integration in between the pacemaker subsystems
will always prioritize the lower lens eye over the other eyes
of the rhopalium when the former is currently modulated by
visual input with spatial information, producing thus a specific
signal characteristic to obstacle avoidance (see Garm and Mori,
2009 for details).
Therefore, and considering only the lower lens eye in the
dominant rhopalium, it seems that the most important step
in the whole process is stage 1, which happens at the retinal
neurons10. In typical visual systems, this processing happens in
various stages and visual centers. In vertebrates, for example,
specific aspects of spatial information (e.g., feature recognition)
are handled by parallel pathways of processing that happen in
large and complex receptive fields of neurons that are found in
higher visual centers than this of retinal photoreceptors (Bartels
and Zeki, 1998, see also footnote 20). And these neuronal
fields correspond to highly filtered information necessary for
the specific visual tasks. The similarity to the vertebrate eye
notwithstanding, there are no higher visual centers in TC, since
the rest of its central NS doesn’t have the resources to process
spatial information coming from the lens eyes (Skogh et al.,
2006). However, spatial information sensitive to the task is
processed directly by the retina: large receptive fields are found
at the level of retinal photoreceptors, each one of them allowing
complex filtering of different aspects of spatial information in
parallel, much earlier than in more advanced visual systems
(Nilsson et al., 2005). Let us see how.
There are at least two large and complex receptive fields
at the level of retinal photoreceptors in TC that correspond
to the so-called matched filters that enable TC’s NS to deal
only with environmental information essential to the task.
The first one enables a low-pass spatiotemporal filtering. This
gives a spatial resolution of 10◦–20◦ (depending on the retinal
area), and a low temporal resolution for the lower lens eye
(O’Connor et al., 2010). The second matched filter enables
10Indeed, in TC, the synaptic morphology of the photoreceptor cells in the retina,
as well as the whole rhopalium, suggests that the first stages of visual processing
occur in the retina (Gray et al., 2009).
pattern-dependent sensitivity and directionality of the response
to the task. As we will see in more detail next, a series of
behavioral experiments have shown that the animal is more able
to detect vertical than horizontal obstacles. This is probably due
to the fact that the retina of TC is genetically better at detecting
more vertical than horizontal contrast line orientations due to
directional contrast enhancement11. The combination of low-pass
spatiotemporal filtering and pattern-dependent directionality
removes informational aspects that are irrelevant to the context
of obstacle avoidance and allow the essential ones to be further
processed by the NS. The combination of these two matched
filters enables the animal to detect large and stationary/slowly
moving and mainly vertical structures strongly resembling the
prop roots of the mangle trees among which it swims in search
of light shafts full of copepods12.
In the lack of further processing by higher visual centers in
TC’s NS, this combination of the two matched filters cannot be
implemented without some form of integration13 at the retina,
which will produce the unique visual signal to be sent to the
related pacemaker subsystem, so that stage 2 of processing can
begin. Matched filters work by extracting the sensory stimuli
crucial for the animal’s survival, severely limiting the non-
important stimuli according to the task (Warrant, 2016). In the
next section we argue in detail that obstacle avoidance in the box
jellyfish during stage 1 of visual processing is a minimal form of
content-based perception.
OBSTACLE AVOIDANCE IS MEDIATED
BY STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATIONS
A series of behavioral experiments by Garm et al. (2007a, 2013)
has shown that obstacle avoidance is indirectly correlated with
the size of the obstacle on the retina, based on actual distal
detection of the obstacle as an object in an image using spatial
information that is both contrast- and pattern-dependent. In
their experiments Garm et al. (2013) found, as a general result,
that TC will initiate obstacle avoidances more frequently and
further away from the obstacles the higher the contrast of the
obstacle and the closer to vertical its orientation (ibid. Figures 1–
3, pp. 4,521–4,523)14. This task involves processing a lot of spatial
information (with several important aspects relevant to the task,
such as size, orientation of the object, and distance to the object)
for a limited number of neurons in the rhopalium.
The experiments have also shown that if the eye is triggered
by a visual scene with no spatial information (i.e., lack of a
11The morphology of the synapses between neighboring photoreceptors in the
lower lens eye suggests enhancement of vertical stripes (Gray et al., 2009).
12The fact that the lower lens eye has a specific and heavy spatiotemporal filtering
at the periphery is vital to efficient obstacle avoidance, since it prevents responses
from interfering with the animal’s (much faster though blind) foraging behavior–
the animal is blind to the small and fast-moving copepods, which it hunts only by
the touch as it swims in the light shafts with its tentacles spread.
13In the next section we develop this point.
14The authors presented the animal with vertical obstacles with three different
stripe orientations (vertical, 45◦ oblique, and horizontal) set against five different
gray tones, resulting in different contrasts ranging from 0.93 (the darkest) to 0.17
(the lightest).
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simultaneous combination of light rays coming from different
directions associated with spatial differences) but with a uniform
decrease of the same magnitude in the light intensity across
the entire visual field (such as that produced in the presence
of an obstacle), the animal fails to elicit any obstacle avoidance
behavior. This demonstrates that the animal detects the obstacle
as an object using spatial information (Garm et al., 2013, Figure 4,
p. 4,524)15.
Based on these experiments, in the following subsections we
will discuss in detail three main aspects of this visual process:
(i). that the visual state that guides obstacle avoidance employs
a constancy mechanism, (ii). the integrated nature of the retinal
processing that decouples the visual state from its environmental
antecedents, and (iii). the similarity of the visual state to its
target object. Although we treat these three aspects separately for
demonstrating purposes, it should be noted that they are different
aspects of the same neural structure, namely of the formation
of the visual state that guides obstacle avoidance. As we explain
in Section “The Representational Role of the Neurodynamic
Structure of Obstacle Avoidance”, these three aspects of visual
processing are all together necessary and sufficient for a visual
state to be representational.
Obstacle Avoidance in T. cystophora
Involves a Primitive Constancy
Mechanism
In the experiments by Garm and colleagues, the mean size of
the obstacle on the retina capable of eliciting a response (i.e.,
the minimum angular distance between two objects required for
the animal to see them as two rather than one merged object)
is around 25◦, and this is almost the same for any object with
highest contrast (Garm et al., 2013). So, if the object is around
2 cm wide and within 5–6 cm16, TC will detect and try to
avoid it (ibid, Table 1, p. 4,526). Interestingly, the experiments
demonstrate that TC won’t elicit an avoidance response when it
is confronted with 2 cm-or-wider objects that are far away, but it
will avoid objects down to 1 cm wide if they are very close (Garm
et al., 2007a). This shows that the eye is not just a simple trigger
sensor, which would yield a non-differential obstacle avoidance
to all 2 cm-or-wider objects in the environment, incapable of
avoiding obstacles very close to the animal. On the contrary,
the lens eye of TC is able to accommodate such foraging-related
capacities with the employment of a very primitive (or pre-
) constancy mechanism that provides an ecologically related
stability to the animal’s decision to initiate obstacle avoidance. Let
us elaborate a bit more on this.
The animal depends on the flow of visual sensorial
registrations to successfully control its swimming with respect
to the target object–i.e., to regulate direction and speed while
15This has also been electrophysiologically tested by projecting of moving
black/dark bars (resembling vertical obstacles) traveling across the animal’s visual
field. This resulted in a sharp increase in the swim pacemaker signaling frequency,
while a uniform decrease of the same magnitude in light intensity across the entire
visual field triggered no response at all (see Bielecki and Garm, 2018, Figure 27.10,
p. 618).
16A visual angle around 25◦–30◦ corresponds to obstacles of a diameter of around
2 cm in a distance of 6–5 cm (Garm et al., 2007a).
remaining far away from the object. And distal actions would
likely require correlating with environmental properties relevant
to the task–in our case, a certain width and orientation of
the object so that it resembles a prop root to be avoided.
Yet, as Burge has pointed out (see Burge, 2010, pp. 397–398),
these crucial (to the task) aspects that are conveyed by sensory
registration underdetermine the object properties, since they
are also influenced by the circumstances of the interaction
(perspectival aspects) –in our case, the TC’s positioning in the
environment. This part of the sensory registration influenced
by the perspectival aspects is not likely to correlate with
environmental conditions relevant to the task, thus causing
variation and ambiguity to the proximal stimulations (to be
processed by the retina) with respect to the properties of the
object. Therefore, a putative constancy mechanism in TC should
at least provide a form of stability in the production of percepts of
obstacles to be avoided in the face of ambiguous variations in the
proximal stimulations of the target object due to changes in TC’s
positioning with respect to that object. How could the lens eye of
TC do that?
One aspect of the experiments by Garm et al. (2013) that is
particularly worth noting is that there seems to be a contrast-
dependent mechanism for detecting the distance of an object
in the visual scene17. Due to its blurred vision and relatively
scarce neural resources, TC does not have the means to precisely
determine distance. But the animal uses instead its ability to
measure the light contrast of a given object, which decreases
with distance in the turbulent waters in which it lives due to
high light absorption and scattering. This implies that TC uses
contrast to indirectly detect the distance of an object (see ibid,
p. 4,526). This is crucial for a putative constancy mechanism.
More specifically, and applying the two-track account of gradual
constancy suggested by Schulte (2020), the primitive constancy
mechanism in TC can be viewed as being crucially sensitive
to a particular proximal variable, namely the size of the object’s
registrations on the retina, which is causally dependent on both
the obstacle size (the target variable) and the distance from
which the obstacle is seen (the confounding variable)18. What
“disentangles” the information about an object’s size contained
in retinal registrations from the information about its distance
is that the visual mechanism is sensitive–although, in our case,
mostly for vertical objects–to another (auxiliary, and in this case
proximal) variable, namely contrast, that acts as an indirect cue19
17As we discuss in the next section, this doesn’t mean that obstacle avoidance in
TC is triggered by a contrast threshold (Garm et al., 2013).
18Drawing on Schulte, a constancy mechanism can be distinguished from a
mere sensory indicator by the fact that it is based on information of two
variables. In our case, the variable (K) of the object’s size depicted at the retina is
“informationally ambiguous” not only in the general sense that a particular value
of K (i.e., a particular size of the object’s depiction at the retina) is compatible with
many different values of T (i.e., many different object sizes when viewed from
different distances), but also because, under biologically normal conditions, not
all activations of 2 cm or more at the retina should evoke an avoidance. Hence,
values of K do not carry any biologically significant amount of information about
the value of the target variable T unconditionally (see 2020, pp. 12–13 for a detailed
discussion).
19We say this is a primitive case of a constancy mechanism because (i). the stability
in the veridical percept is enabled through contrast, which is an indirect proximal
cue about distance (there are no resources in the NS for calculating relative
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used by the animal to calculate the distance to the target object.
And this is why, most of the time, TC manages to respond
differentially to the ecologically relevant size (and distance) of
objects (i.e., to potential obstacles) and not merely to the direct
information of their registrations on the retina.
The Characteristics and Properties of
the Neurophysiological Process of
Obstacle Avoidance
As we have seen, visually guided obstacle avoidance requires
processing a lot of spatial information. In the vertebrate eyes, the
environmental stimulations registered on the retina are further
filtered and processed in parallel retinal pathways and then
integrated into a unique visual signal20. We have no specific
neurophysiological knowledge of how optical information from
the lens eyes of box jellyfish is processed by the retina (Bielecki
and Garm, 2018), and we don’t expect the same degree of
functional complexity (and of the underlying circuitry) in the
retina of TC. However, apart from the resemblances regarding the
optical characteristics, the essential architecture and functioning
of the retina, as well as the configuration of the eye in the NS of
TC–practically, the eye is directly embedded in the central NS–is
similar to the situation in vertebrates (Garm et al., 2006). As such,
in the context of parallel retinal processing, the term “integration”
could be broadly understood as a phenomenon that occurs when
a set of different and initially independent processes–such as
those of the two matched filters–functionally cooperate and share
their local functions, leading to the establishment of a wider
functional organization, in which some functional constraints of
the constituent processes are interlocked and control each other,
producing thus a unique visual signal. The emergence of a new
functionally integrated structure in the retina, therefore, requires
a functional redefinition of the original processes of extraction of
the relevant sensory stimuli and of the eventual matched filtering.
In the context of retinal processing, the role played by single
neurons cannot explain a functional motor action like distal
swimming. Neurons can change the state of the NS, but they are
still cut off from direct action in the outside world, being insulated
from it by other processing groups of neural cells that lie between
them and the muscles. So, the function changes across levels
(Cao, 2012). Thus, in the case of distal obstacle avoidance, only a
higher and integrated level of the retinal information can generate
movements, depth of focus, and/or relative size combined with any knowledge of
absolute size), and (ii). the stability of the constancy (i.e., the formation of veridical
percept for the task) comes in a gradual way–as contrast decreases there are fewer
formations of veridical percepts for the task, hence fewer avoidances.
20Parallel processing in multiple retinal pathways and interconnections between
them is one of the most important common aspects of the vertebrate retinal
organization and functioning (Shigihara and Zeki, 2014). In a very first
approximation of the workings of retinal integration processing, the highly
complex circuitry of the retina creates a series of parallel pathways from the
single layer of photoreceptors. The outer segments of photoreceptors convert
(in a process called phototransduction, which involves several catalyzers and
feedback loops) incoming light into membrane potential variations, causing thus,
synaptic activity in each photoreceptor. In turn, the inner segments of the receptors
spatiotemporally integrate the input from phototransduction (through strong
modulatory feedback with other cells) into signals that are then transmitted to
ganglions that will in turn integrate them in order to convey visual information
of the eye to the brain (see Wohrer, 2008 for details).
a meaningful set of functions. Accordingly, in TC, the continuous
sensory information registered in the retinal receptors is received,
filtered and processed in parallel, and eventually integrated to
form a temporally discrete neurodynamic structure (NDS)21, with
a clear functional relevance in visually guided swimming. It is this
NDS that drives the distal avoidance of objects.
Therefore, by the integration of a continual flow of the
registered retinal data, a NDS in cubozoan retinas acts as
decoupled and higher-level control, guiding obstacle avoidance
in a context of uninterrupted sensorimotor interactions of the
box jellyfish with the environment. The integration processes
at the retina introduce a decoupling of the retinal state from
the environmental stimulus, since the functioning of the NDS
cannot be reduced to the functioning of single retinal neurons
nor to any set of them. This decoupling of the NDS becomes
apparent also through the delay of its formation. While the
animal incessantly registers stimulations in its retinal cells as
it swims and visually interacts with its natural habitat, these
stimulations cannot be integrated into a visual signal by its eye in
less than just over 100 ms (see O’Connor et al., 2010). So, there is
a neurophysiologically considerable delay in the formation of the
NDS in relation to the continuous registration of environmental
stimulations due to the integration processing in the retina.
Successful Obstacle Avoidance Depends
on Structural Similarity
The behavioral assays by Garm et al. (2013) showed the following
results regarding TC’s interaction with obstacles of different
contrast and orientation:
1. Increasing contrast results in the animal staying farther
away from the obstacle and initiating more avoidances for
all three stripe orientations (ibid. Figure 6, p. 4,527).
2. Contrast-dependency varies in accordance with the
orientation of the stripes, with the animal having the
strongest response to obstacles with vertical stripes, an
intermediate response to those with oblique stripes, and
the weakest response to those with horizontal stripes, for
all different contrasts (ibid. Table 1, p. 4,526).
3. There is a gradual change in the strength of the response
(measured through the average distance from the obstacle,
avoidance rate, and obstacle size on the retina), at least for
those obstacles with vertical stripes (ibid, p. 4,526).
When the box jellyfish is close to an object in its environment,
its capacity to distinguish that object as a full and separate
entity is directly proportional to its contrast, size, verticality,
and immobility, and secondarily (and indirectly as discussed)
to its size. Otherwise, so long as the animal, for whatever
reason, cannot visually detect an object with respect to its size,
21Here we use the concept of neurodynamic structure (NDS) as it has been defined
by Barandiaran and Moreno (2006) as “the subset of internal variables and their
relationships involved in a certain sensorimotor coupling. An NDS emerges when
(for a given time window) we can systematically reduce the dimensionality of
the internal operational organization of the NS to explain the behavior of the
system.” (p. 177). Thus, we use the term “neurodynamic structure” instead of
“neural pattern” to emphasize the specific integrated and higher-level nature of
the retinal structure compared to individual retinal cells.
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shape and gray-toned color (i.e., it cannot distinguish its spatial
information from the rest of the visual scene), obstacle avoidance
is poorer (in terms of avoidance rate and distance from the
object). Moreover, there is a gradual change in the strength of
the response (avoidances happening more frequently and farther
away from the obstacle), with vertical shapes initiating stronger
avoidances, followed by oblique and then horizontal ones. In
other words, the darker, larger, slower, and more vertical the
obstacle is, the faster and more frequently the animal detects it
as a full and separate object, and the faster and more frequently
it will avoid it. When confronted with a dark, relatively large
and vertical object, should the animal, for whatever reason (water
murkiness, turbidity, etc.), construct a different (and less similar)
NDS (e.g., a retinal integration producing a combination of
patterns of neuronal activation corresponding to an oblique,
light gray object), this would result in less successful obstacle
avoidance, since the response would be initiated not only less
frequently, but also more slowly, i.e., at a smaller distance from
(closer to) the object.
We could infer from these behavioral data, that this is a
case of structural similarity between the visual percept and its
target in the environment. It is the global structure of the retinal
organization (NDS), whose integrated sub-patterns of activation
are associated (at least) with size, contrast, and shape, that
corresponds to objects of a certain size (and shape) at a certain
distance in the environment. So, when the correspondence
between components in the visual percept (sub-patterns in the
integrated retinal organization) and size, distance, and shape of
the objects in the environment is strengthened, the likelihood of
TC achieving obstacle avoidance increases, and vice versa22.
This systematic correspondence between the relevant features
of the environment and the NDS formed by the lower lens eye,
as well as the relationship between this eye and the other visual
sensors (stage 2 and 3 of processing), is deeply embedded in the
animal’s context of action (i.e., on what the animal is doing and
22Structural similarity has been defined in various ways, but the consensual
definition (one that considers and satisfies the important common aspects) is as
follows (see O’Brien and Opie, 2004, p. 11 and Isaac, 2013, pp. 688–689): Structure
A comprising a set of objects O and a set of relations RO defined on the members
of O is structurally similar to structure B comprising a set of components C and
a set of relations RC, iff (i) There is a similarity map between AO = f(O, RO) and
BC = f(C, RC), such that (ii) This map is a homomorphism induced by a causal
process in which the structure of A causally influenced the structure of B, and (iii)
The homomorphism results in an (at least partial) structure preservation of the
two entities involved so as for at least some objects in O and some relations in RO,
there is a one-to-one mapping from O to C and a one-to-one mapping from RO
to RC, such that when a relation in RO holds of objects in O, the corresponding
relation in RC holds of the corresponding objects in C. In the case of T. cystophora,
the physical inputs are arrayed across the retina forming an optical image of the
object (AV). But as we discussed, this bi-dimensional pattern of excitation on the
retina is then projected in different neuronal fields, each one dealing with different
aspects [e.g., size, shape, distance–holding in between them various relations (RC)]
of the optical information C, and where through various transformations and
processing (e.g., filtering) signals–that are related with different visual aspects–are
then integrated into the visual signal of the retina BC (i.e., what we call the NDS).
Hence, it is the NDS that is the homomorphic structure (BC) of the environmental
scene (AO). Considering that the animal responds only to spatial information (and
not to mere differences in light intensities), it is sensible to assume that at each
stage of processing the components C (sub-patterns of activation in the integrated
retinal structure) preserve (at least partially) the respective set of relations (RO) of
the object (e.g., an object of a certain size and shape, see also Palmer, 1999).
the type of environment in which it is doing it). The lower lens
eye will be involved in obstacle avoidance whenever a full object is
detected in the retina, but it will be involved differently (or not at
all) when there is simply a change in ambient illumination, since
in that case the animal is likely to be in a light shaft containing
swarms of copepods to be caught and eaten. Therefore, the
NDS of the lower lens eye during obstacle avoidance exhibits
a considerable degree of exploitable structural similarity to its
target in the environment (see Gładziejewski and Miłkowski,
2017; Shea, 2018). Moreover, the homomorphism between the
NDS and the world preserves not only the static structure of the
object, but it also preserves a resemblance between the different
NDSs and the downstream processing in which the obtained
similarity plays a causal role. And this is evident by the fact that
it’s exploitation by the animal provides differential responds to
the world that hold the said resemblance (i.e., a set of like objects
at nearby locations in the environment will generate the same or
closely related responses).
We conclude that we can systematically correlate similarities
between changes in the environmental structure and changes
in the animal’s obstacle avoidance behavior on the basis of the
exploitable structural similarity between the NDS and the related
environmental structure. Also, the similarity does neither obtain
at the level of each cellular state nor at any range of them
as they are reflected on the retina and construct an optical
image (due to integration processing at the retina). Moreover,
the homomorphism provides also a similarity between possible
stimuli and possible responses (due to exploitation). Accordingly,
the NDS in TC constructs a second-order structural similarity to
its target object (see also Isaac, 2013; Piccinini, 2018). We suggest
this is the most sensible explanation for the NDS at the retina
of TC based on the available neurologically-informed behavioral
data regarding the retina’s workings and its relation to obstacle
avoidance.
The Representational Role of the
Neurodynamic Structure of Obstacle
Avoidance
Considering all these aspects together, there are good reasons to
defend that the cubozoan visual system implies a minimal form
of representation. Next, we will briefly present these reasons.
In order to legitimately consider something–a state or
structure–a representation, the general consensus is that it must
fulfill three conditions. Let us primarily consider the first two:
(i) that a representation should cause successful actions, and
(ii) be decoupled from the structure of the related incoming
physical inputs (i.e., light rays captured by the animal’s eyes).
In other words, to be representational, the state or structure
cannot be a mere indicator23. In relation to the first condition,
we have shown that TC’s distal action is based on the NDS
(the neural support of the visual percept), hence the latter
plays an essential role in successfully avoiding obstacles. The
second requirement is also fulfilled. Although Orlandi (2014)
23What distinguishes a representational structure from a mere indicator is usually
understood as the capacity of the former to represent even in the absence of the
stimulus (Ramsey, 2007, pp. 119–20).
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claims that minimal vision is not representational because
there is no capacity for internally recording absent things, she
nevertheless considers the capacity to perceive an entity which
is only partially seen to be an instance of minimal absence
(see pp. 125–127)24. Certainly, the cubozoan NS does not yet
have the capacity for storage (memory) and associative learning
required for off-line use of the distal information provided
by visual percepts. However, what makes the swim guiding
NDSs representations rather than mere indicators is that their
construction and modification/updating (a) are endogenously
controlled; (b) depend on an internal integrative organization of
the NDS itself, and (c) employ a primitive constancy mechanism
so that they are not determined (although they may be affected)
by the causal coupling with the target. Taken together, all this
may be considered sufficient indication that the NDS does its job
“in a decoupled way” from its target. Thus, the NDS that guides
obstacle avoidance in TC is a performance-guiding structure
that is decoupled from environmental light inputs (generating
continuous sets of microscopic retinal stimulations) because it
is the result of a complex process of integration that employs
(primitive) constancies.
These factors are precisely what lead Burge (2010, 2014) to
argue that visual perception is a minimal form of representation.
He further argues that since the construction of a visual percept
is underdetermined by the raw visual data, solving this problem–
by prioritizing certain possible environmental (distal) causes
over others–leaves the formation of perceptual states vulnerable
to error. Yet, we think Burge hasn’t realized this is only a
necessary, not a sufficient condition. And this is what drives
us to the third and fundamental requirement for a structure to
be considered as a representation, emphasized by many other
authors. O’Brien and Opie (2004), Isaac (2013), Gładziejewski
(2016), and Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017), for instance,
argue that a state or structure can be legitimately considered
a representation only if there is an (exploitable) structural
similarity/correspondence between the candidate structure and
the environmental features that are represented (i.e., the target
of the representation). We agree with these authors on this
point, since only in such a relational context (such as that
of structural similarity) successful distal action requires the
capacity to construct NDSs which are (structurally) similar (to
some extent) to some conditions that depend on a specific set
of environmental elements relevant for the target action. It is
only in this context that it would be logical to assume that
any deviation from the required similarity will diminish the
success of the action.
And this is where accuracy and error come non-derivatively
into play, since it is only within a context of a “correspondence”–
between the NDS and its target in the environment–that ignoring
and detaching from the continuous proximal registration
that underdetermines the NDS can be considered to have
24Even if TC sees the obstacle as a macroscopic object, it definitely cannot see the
entire obstacle (i.e., it cannot see all its sides at once). TC is a case of a (cognitive)
system whose processes unfold in a purely on-line manner controlling an ongoing,
direct interaction with the world. This is in accordance with the suggestion by
Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) that structural representations should not be
restricted to the domain of off-line cognition (p. 351).
accuracy conditions with respect to the environmental causal
antecedents of this very structure. In turn, it is only in such a
context that it could plausibly be suggested that inaccuracy (or
misrepresentation) occurs–because of an ecologically-significant
mismatch between the structure of the target domain and the
actual action-guiding structure of the representation (see also
Lee, 2018, p. 616).
Structural representations cannot misrepresent on their
own; they either function or not. But as we discussed, the
perspectival nature of TC’s visual interaction implies that
structural representations induced by the same causal process
may contain very different quantities of information about
the target. Of course, as Burge generally states, constancy is
exactly the mechanism to avoid such errors resulting from the
underdetermination of the object by the sensory stimulation.
However, the employment of any constancy mechanism would
be totally “blind” to the task had the retinal processing pathways
been hardwired (through evolution) to construct a NDS that
doesn’t hold any structural resemblance to its target in the
environment, or (most importantly) had it been hardwired
in a way that (most of the ecologically-relevant times of the
interaction) the eye wasn’t able to construct a “similar” structure.
So, it’s not that constancy mechanisms are not necessary for
the possibility of error, but, more correctly, that constancy
mechanisms would be relevant to the task (and hence, prone
to error) only if they are employed by a sensory state that
constructs structures through which it can successfully interact
with the environment25. Accordingly, a neural structure bears
content, in so far as it is a NDS whose role in the organism’s
capacity for adaptive interaction depends on its accuracy in the
context of similarity/correspondence. And this is why the NDS
has the content it does; it is precisely because of its similarity to
environmental factors that it has conditions of accuracy26.
Summing up, we have explained (i) how the cubozoan NDSs
of the lower lens eyes possess content; and (ii) how–and why–
these NDSs play a causal role by virtue of their content. This latter
aspect is a fundamental point because, as Ramsey (2007) argues,
for a structure to be representational it is required that its content
would serve or function as a representation in a larger system (see
also Hutto, 2011; Segundo-Ortin, 2019). This structure must be
shown to play a causal role in the organism’s functioning by virtue
of its content. This is the aspect of “why” that Ramsey emphasizes.
In other words, something is representational when its similarity
to a state of the world not only “explains” a successful action,
but also causes it. In our case, answering to Ramsey’s question,
namely, why the NDS of our case is representational, we reply
that it is so because it enables the animal to act from a distance by
virtue of the accuracy of its NDS. Only if the structural similarity
25A complete defense that structural correspondence is necessary for genuine
representation is beyond the scope of this paper. But we suggest it is a well-
grounded conjecture according to our analysis.
26So, the normative standard for evaluating the constancy-bearing NDS is, as
argued, that it is used by the animal for a successful obstacle avoidance based on the
accuracy of its content obtained on the basis of the exploitable structural similarity
of the NDS to its target. It is noted that grounding content in this way requires
different explanatory conditions from those used in explaining the dimension of
the functional role of the NDS (a requirement also mention by Ramsey, 2016).
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between the NDS and its target–obstacles in the environment–is
causally relevant to the success of the mechanism (i.e., obstacle
avoidance) that makes use of the representation can we ensure
that “Ramsey’s job” is fulfilled.
HOW MINIMAL ARE THE PERCEPTUAL
REPRESENTATIONS OF TC? REPLIES
TO SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
FROM LIBERAL
REPRESENTATIONALISM
In what follows we comment on a set of possible objections to
our thesis coming from the field of liberal representationalism27.
Liberal representationalists defend a very extensive use of
representations, where some internal states of very simple
organisms (like unicellular organisms or plants) are considered
as genuine representations (Artiga, 2016, 2021). We certainly
disagree with this position, since, as Ramsey (2007), Burge (2010),
Orlandi (2014), and Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) among
others suggest, liberal and deflationary accounts can easily fall
prey to panrepresentationalism, or/and trivialize and dissolve
the notion of representation to the point that it abolishes any
explanatory power. Yet, here we will not discuss this issue in
general but only in what affects our thesis, since according to
this position, our case study would certainly be an example of
representationally guided behavior, but not a minimal case.
In a recent paper Ganson (2020; see also Artiga, 2021 for
a similar view) argues that representations do not require
decoupling from specific stimulus conditions. Ganson’s point is
that the information-carrying role of sensory states is required to
explain successful task performance, i.e., successful coordination
of outputs with environmental conditions conducive to the
success of those outputs. For example, the coordination of
ovulation with the presence of a male in the phenomenon of
induced ovulation through detection of pheromones. In this
case, Ganson argues, the stimulus condition (e.g., pheromones)
is different from the environmental condition with which the
animal’s behavior should be coordinated (e.g., a potential male).
For the coordination with the environment to be achieved,
the potential information about significant features of the
environment (potential male)–carried by the stimulus condition
(pheromones) and exploited by the receptors–should be added
to the causal chain of events from stimulus to behavior. Hence,
sensory states have an information-conveying role in addition
to their causal role, and we can separate the former from
the latter by intervening on the former (e.g., by manipulating
the environmental conditions). These interventions, according
to Ganson, reveal the explanatory role of information in
successful task performance. Accordingly, the success of the
27We will not discuss here the position of the authors that argue that animal
vision in general (and especially in the case of phylogenetically older invertebrates)
does not need representations; a claim especially maintained by advocates of
radical embodiment or/and enactivism (Thompson, 2007; Chemero, 2009; Hutto
and Myin, 2013, 2017; Di Paolo et al., 2017). We consider that we have already
addressed this objection in section “Obstacle avoidance is mediated by structural
representations.”
organism’s inflexible response to the stimulus depends on the
informational content (instead of the stimulus) of the sensory
state. In general, liberal representationalism argues against the
requirement of decoupleability in order to distinguish the merely
causal from the representational role of sensory states in highly
inflexible behavior.
But if all correlational information necessary for the behavior’s
success could only be altered and manipulated externally,
then the outcome of the behavior wouldn’t be explained by
the information-carrying role of the sensory state but by the
environment itself. Accordingly, the coordination of highly
inflexible behaviors guided by sensory states triggered by stimulus
conditions that are not present in the environment seems like (or
are even weaker than) a mere reaction–if not a blind guess–on
the part of the organism. Hence, it is highly undetermined how
those sensory states come to do any explanatory work, at all. The
problem is not so much that those sensory states are dispensable
to the explanation of the related behaviors (the sensory state does
causal work–what Dretske (1988) calls a “structuring cause”),
but that there is no content, at all–at least not on the behalf
of the organism.
Yet, as we will explain, the requirement for constancy-
dependent decoupleability (and consequently, for the
endogenous control of the construction of the representational
state) is also crucial in explaining the qualitative
difference between structural representations and mere
indicators/detectors. Take for instance the escape behavior
of the hydrozoan Aglantha digitale. Lacking vision, A. digitale
relies on many different proximal sensors. When a predator
approaches, it produces a certain type of vibration in the water
that activates the animal’s hair-like sensory cells. These cells
thereupon send a spike directly to the ring giant axon, which
is propagated in both directions all along the ring, activating
eight motors, thus driving the animal upward very quickly.
The general feature of the different behaviors displayed by
A. digitale (as well as by other swimming medusae lacking
true vision) is that, in each case, a sensory detector (or a
combination of different sensory detectors) directly converts
proximal stimulations into signals for the animal’s NS (Mackie,
2004). Liberal representationalists would argue that since the
proximal registration (the vibration of the water) produced
a certain sensory state (the stimulated hair-like sensory cells)
causing the giant ring axon to fire and thus contracting the
muscles and enabling the animal to swim in direction different
to the vibrations, the sensory state is representational. However,
in the absence of any constancy mechanism, this would be
explanatorily unnecessary. Since, in the case of purely biological
behaviors, the internal states triggered by the stimuli do not
play any causally efficacious work apart from its structuring
cause, ascribing them a representational status would be
explanatory dispensable with respect to the behavior. Let us
elaborate on this.
The triggered state indicates movement in the water (the
distal target object). Now, if the sensory system of A. digitale
were isomorphic to the vibrations of the water (i.e., for every
change in the water there exists a behaviorally significant change
in the animal’s sensors, and vice versa), then the sensory
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state would operate as a switch specific for each instance of
vibration (i.e., for each different value of the target object).
In this case, A. digitale could react in only one specific (and
possibly different) way for each one of the different instances
of water vibration, independently of the animal’s perspective.
Presumably, the sensory system has a homeomorphic relation
to changes in the water (i.e., for a behaviorally significant
change in the animal’s sensors there exists a change in the
water vibrations, but not vice versa), and the sensory system
is capable of discriminating ranges of vibration strength (e.g.,
from a weak vibration produced by a small rock hitting the
water surface to a strong vibration produced by the movement
of a big fish nearby). In this second case, A. digitale can again
react in only one (and again, possibly different) way for each
value of vibration within the various different ranges of water
vibration (e.g., keep swimming leisurely in case of a weak
vibration produced by a small rock, and escape in case of a strong
vibration produced by a big fish), but again, independently of
the animal’s perspective. So, in both cases, A. digitale would be
able to produce always the same (though possibly different from
each other) behaviors for each one of the different (ranges of)
instances of the distal target object. And this is why, in both
cases the A. digitale’s sensory system is capable only of inflexible
behaviors. Accordingly, none of the aforementioned biological
facts regarding the escape circuitry has any representational role
to play in the explanation of A. digitale’s behavior, exactly because,
due to the inflexibility of the behavior, there is no space for
any causally efficacious meaning of the sensory state after the
description of the complete causal chain of events from the
stimulus to the behavior28.
Things are substantially different in TC. Firstly, the sensory
system in TC enables the animal to deal in the same way with
different instances of the distal target object–the animal will
avoid objects of different shape at the same distance or/and the
same object at the same distance when it sees it from different
angles. But most importantly, TC will demonstrate different
behaviors for the same instance of the distal target object (i.e.,
a prop root with a certain size and shape), depending on the
animal’s perspective (its distance to the prop root). Therefore, in
stark difference to the sensory system of A. digitale, the capacity
of the lower lens eye in TC to build a constancy-dependent
percept (supported by the NDS) is what explains its capacity for
28Indeed, each one interaction of Aglantha digitale with a certain value of a target
object (e.g., a certain strength of water vibration) or with any range of values of
a target object, would have its own causal chain of description, part of which will
be a different sensory state for each of the values (or range of values) of a target
object. Hence, the same sensory state of A. digitale cannot be part of different
causal chains (e.g., of both escaping and keep swimming leisurely) of the animal’s
interaction with the same value of a distal target variable (e.g., strong vibration).
Therefore, describing A. digitale’s behavior using representational terms for each
one of those sensory states would be a characteristic case of a deflationary concept
of representation. Schulte (2019) mounts a similar argument to object to liberal
representationalism by commenting on a putative representational explanation
of the Venus fly trap case. As he says, such ascriptions of representational status
violate the explanatory requirement, namely that genuine representational states
are those that “they are (a) capable of entering into explanations of behavior qua
representational states, i.e., in virtue of their representational properties, and (b)
that these explanations cannot be replaced (without loss) by explanations that only
appeal to non-representational properties, e.g., explanations that only appeal to the
intrinsic, “syntactic” properties of representational states.” (p. 336).
displaying actively flexible interaction with the same instance of a
target object in a range of different contexts/perspectives. This is
why, contrary to the case of A. digitale’s escape (or any other kind
of similar) behavior, the NDS of the lower lens eye does added
work in the explanation of TC’s obstacle avoidance behavior.
And it does so because the NDS is what explains the animal’s
choice among different causal chains (i.e., available options)
for its interaction with the same instance of a distal target
object, depending on the context of the interaction–i.e., on the
animal’s perspective. In the case of purely biological behaviors,
the internal states triggered by the stimuli do not play any
causally efficacious work apart from its structuring cause, hence
ascribing them a representational status would be explanatory
dispensable with respect to the behavior. Additionally, this
is why not only constancy mechanisms need a context of
structural similarity in order to produce veridical content, but
also, it is the reason why structural representations require
constancy-dependent decoupleability, so that their difference to
indicators/detectors cannot be considered as one of a degree (as
suggested by Nirshberg and Shapiro, 2020) but of a kind.
Therefore, as we have argued so far, there is a significant
difference between a constancy-bearing structurally similar state
and a mere indicator. And this can also be illustrated in
a complementary way applying Sterelny’s distinction between
robust-process and actual-sequence explanation (Sterelny, 1995;
see also Schulte, 2015). In general, any behavior can be explained
by a careful description of the sequence of the actual events.
Obviously, both the cases of A. digitale’s escape and of TC’s
obstacle avoidance can be explained by the description of the
precise sequence of the actual neurobiological events that led
to the motor actions expressed in the behaviors of the two
animals. But the case of TC can only be completely explained
on the basis of a degree of similarity between the NDS and
the distal features of the environment, as a result of being
guided by a sensory (visual) state elaborated by constancies. And
this explanation would be valid for a range of environmental
conditions (e.g., for objects of different sizes, seen from different
distances or/and angles, with different contrasts). In the case of
A. digitale, the actual-sequence type of explanation is also the
most robust-process type of explanation available, whereas in the
case of TC, a robust-process explanation is qualitatively different
than the actual-sequence one, since it is an explanation freed
from the specificities of the proximal retinal stimulations, and
therefore, it is an explanation that includes the various options
of behavior available to the animal when it interacts with the
same object. And this is possible because obstacle avoidance is
a (genuinely) intentional behavior targeted to distal features that
are represented by the animal.
So, constancy-dependent decoupleability within a context of
structural similarity of a neuronal state with its environmental
target provides a qualitative distinction between structural
representations and mere indicators because it offers a
connection between genuinely intentional explanations and
their neurodynamic underpinnings. In other words, the kind
of decoupleability described in TC relates an intentional
explanation of the animal’s behavior with the causal role played
by the NDS in guiding this behavior by virtue of its content.
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CONCLUSION
In the quest for demarcating the minimally representational
behavior, we provided “flesh and bones” to Tyler Burge’s
influential claim that the limits of genuine representational
behavior are the limits of perception satisfied by the most
primitive (non-deflated) representational states. Burge has
strongly argued that what distinguishes genuine (non-
deflated) representational states from mere indicators is the
employment of constancy mechanisms. However, other non-
liberal representationalists have argued that a considerable
degree of exploitable structural correspondence of a state to its
target is sufficient for a state to bear content. Complementing
Burge, we have argued that it is only within a general context
of similarity/correspondence of a constancy-bearing neural
structure that veridical content arises.
We focused on perhaps one of the simplest cases of
behavior based on low-resolution spatial vision in nature–
the visually-guided obstacle avoidance in the cubozoan
medusa T. cystophora–and we argued in detail that this is a case
of a minimal form of content-based visual perception. More
specifically, and based on the neurophysiologically-informed
behavioral data available in the literature, we explained that the
lower lens eye in TC employs (primitive) constancy mechanisms
to construct a decoupled (from the retinal stimulations)
neurodynamic structure, based on which it succeeds obstacle
avoidance in virtue of this structure’s exploitable structural
similarity with its target objects in the environment. Considering
that the lens eyes of TC are the most basic case of true camera-
type eyes in nature, obstacle avoidance in TC is guided by a
minimal form of perceptual representation.
Through this case study, we have shown the operational
difference between genuine representational behavior and
reactions based on mere sensations. Based on an analysis of the
empirical data of the obstacle avoidance swimming of TC, we
have also argued how this behavior is based on the construction
of an integrated neurodynamic structure using a primitive form
of visual constancies. This in turn shows a clear form of
decoupleability from the raw sensorial registration captured by
the visual organs of the animal. Last but not least, we have argued
in what sense the visual percepts of TC show a form of structural
similarity with its environmental target.
All this provides a qualitative distinction between
structural representations and mere indicators, offering also
a connection between genuinely intentional explanations and
their neurodynamic underpinnings. And this, we suggested,
should be indicative of the qualitative distinction between
intentional/cognitive and purely biological behaviors–an aspect
that must be much further pursued by a theory of minimal
representations.
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